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Hollywood itself could hardly have scripted a better battle. According to eyewitnesses, 
a German U-boat lurking off the shores of 
North Point, Prince Edward Island, laid a trap 
for an unsuspecting convoy transitting the 
Northumberland Strait. On 7 May 1943, the 
trap was sprung. Canadian naval escorts and 
aircraft did their best to defend the beleaguered 
convoy from a brazen and unorthodox attack 
that was unlike any other. There could be only 
one conclusion: the German commander was 
half-mad. Just like the fictional Captain Ahab, 
he was willing to take unwarranted risks with 
his boat and men to destroy his white whale that 
came in the form of a troop ship at the centre of 
the convoy. His obsession led to a stunning three 
hour engagement that was brought to a dramatic 
end as the Canadians scored a direct hit forcing 
the U-boat’s bow to rise sharply out of the water 
before sinking.1 The problem is that there is no 
evidence that this battle ever took place. 
 Islanders have retold this story – or versions 
of it – for over 60 years and it likely would have 
remained nothing more than a local legend 
except for one thing: in 1989 a New Brunswick 
diver found a submarine wreck in the precise 
spot where the witnesses claimed the battle took 
place. Despite directions in two separate diving 
guides, no one has managed to relocate this 
wreck which is said to lie 1.25 miles from shore 
in approximately 95 feet of water. The inability 
positively to identify what some call the “anomaly” 
has only fuelled interest. So much so, that major 
Canadian broadcasting networks have aired 
stories on the legend, while a prominent naval 
historian, Marc Milner, used the myth as the 
basis for a novel entitled Incident at North Point. 
Scores of divers, naval scholars and enthusiasts 
have sought a resolution to a mystery that Mary 
Mackay, a Charlottetown journalist, argues is 
“as controversial as the Shroud of Turin and the 
monster at Loch Ness.”2 After years of research 
the shroud over this legend can finally be lifted. 
And the answer not only explains what people 
saw on that May day in 1943, but it also reveals 
important insights about larger historical issues 
involving the power of folklore and its impact on 
local history. 
 If, as historian Marc Milner has asked, the 
object found off PEI was indeed a U-boat, why 
had the Canadian government not trumpeted 
its destruction back in 1943? It was a good 
question. Even more intriguing was the fact that 
neither Canadian nor German naval records 
contained any hint of a battle having been fought 
in this location. When confronted with a lack of 
documentation some have turned to conspiracy 
theories. One such hypothesis holds that Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King’s cabinet covered up 
the sinking of a Vichy French submarine because 
of sensitivities in Quebec towards the pro-Nazi 
government in France. Yet another contends 
that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was guilty 
of hiding some type of horrific friendly-fire 
accident.3 
 Under normal  c ircumstances such 
conspiracies are difficult to refute because they 
are built on the premise that the lack of evidence 
proves the theory. But the diver’s description of 
the object as “covered with debris, lots of nets… 
220 by 25 feet with a large deck gun, a 20 mm 
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5anti-aircraft gun, [and] periscopes” casts serious 
doubt on the possibility that it was an Allied 
submarine. French and Italian ones can also 
be ruled out. What is more compelling is that 
these dimensions are consistent with those of a 
Type VIIC U-boat.4 The theory that the object is 
a Type VIIC is particularly popular with U-boat 
enthusiasts. It also has its detractors.5 Critics 
are quick to point out that none of the U-boats 
lost during the war were anywhere near PEI at 
the time of their loss.6 That being said the U-376 
is particularly important to this investigation 
because it was actually ordered to North Point 
to rescue escaped German naval officers during 
the first week of May 1943. 
 Operation Elster (Magpie in English) was an 
intricate and elaborate plan. German prisoners 
at Camp 70 near Fredericton, New Brunswick, 
were to stage a breakout and make their way to 
North Point. 7 This seemingly impossible gauntlet 
was never attempted. The escape fell through. 
As for the U-376, it was reported as destroyed 
in the Bay of Biscay off France by a British 
Wellington bomber from 172 Squadron. This 
appeared to eliminate the U-376 as a contender 
for the mysterious object off PEI. This changed 
when research in the 1990s conclusively proved 
that the original assessment was wrong. The 
Wellington had actually inflicted serious damage 
on another U-boat rather than U-376.8 And so, 
given that U-376 was not sunk where previously 
presumed; that it was heading for North Point, 
PEI; and that numerous witnesses claim they saw 
a battle in the exact location where a modern-
day diver says the wreck of a U-boat lies, it is 
understandable why some people are convinced 
that the anomaly is a German submarine. At the 
very least it gives the myth resilience against its 
critics. Skeptics would nevertheless reiterate 
that there is absolutely no evidence of any naval 
battle having been fought in this location. They 
are right to say so.
 Canadian officials were aware that some 
type of special operation involving POWs and a 
U-boat was in the works. Coded letters between 
the prisoners at Camp 70 and their homes in 
Germany were used as a means to plan the details 
of Operation Elster.9 What the Germans did 
Unlike the mythical North Point battle, which described an unrealistic and suicidal in-shore surface attack by a U-boat, this 
photo captures the real-life results of a 30-hour “hunt to exhaustion.”  As with most commanders, the captain of the U-744 
did everything in his power to remain submerged and only surfaced when his battery power and oxygen ran short.
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6not know was that this code had been cracked. 
“Intercepted letter to Prisoner of War in Canada,” 
read one British intelligence report, “indicates 
intention [that] the U/Boat shall wait…for several 
days during new moon period in May.” With the 
new moon occurring on 4 May, the RCN had a 
good idea of when the rendezvous was going to 
take place; instead it was their assumption that 
the prisoners would be heading south for the 
Gulf of Maine that was wrong.10 It was a fateful 
mistake.
 Two days after the U-376 was declared 
missing, U-boat Headquarters ordered the 
mission’s backup boat, U-262, to Canada. 
Arriving off North Point at 0631 hours on 2 May, 
the U-262 took up station to the east of the Island 
waiting for some type of signal from the escapees. 
After four days without any sign of the POWs the 
U-boat’s commander finally gave up and returned 
to his base in France empty handed. Despite the 
fact that a U-boat was in the area, the U-262’s 
presence off the eastern shores of North Point 
does not explain what people witnessed on 7 May 
1943. Both the accounts of the battle as well as 
the reported location of the wreck were to the 
west of North Point whereas the log of the U-262 
makes clear that it never once strayed into these 
waters. It also left a full day early.11 
 It is within the details of the mysterious 
battle where the key to the riddle lies. Cracking 
the myth rests with two specific testimonials 
which positively identify the attacking surface 
units as corvettes.12 Based on a distinctive whale 
catcher design, the Flower Class corvette was 
mass-produced for both the RCN and Royal 
Navy (RN) and was therefore one of the most 
recognizable anti-submarine platforms on the 
North Atlantic.13 This promising lead quickly hit 
a dead end. A study of all RCN and RN corvettes 
left little doubt that none were near PEI on the 
day of the battle. Once again, some enthusiasts 
turned to conspiracy theories involving doctored 
ship’s logs to explain this discrepancy, while 
yet another idea was that the eyewitnesses had 
simply mistaken the attacker’s identity. Fairmiles 
and minesweepers were other types of escorts 
that frequented the Gulf of St. Lawrence area, and 
confusing them for a corvette was a reasonable 
possibility. Of course, the RCN and RN were not 
the only navies to operate corvettes. 
 The true story of what happened at North 
Point actually began in Quebec. It was in that 
province where three corvettes being built for the 
RN were transferred to the United States Coast 
Guard. Renamed USS Alacrity, USS Haste and 
USS Intensity, these corvettes made their way 
down the St. Lawrence River en route to Boston. 
This offered local authorities with an opportunity. 
The merchant ship Essex Lance, required an 
escort to take it from Quebec City through the 
Northumberland Strait and the Gulf of Canso 
to Halifax. As a matter of convenience it would 
get three corvettes; and such a disproportionate 
escort presence for a lone merchantman gave an 
impression of importance that the Essex Lance’s 
cargo of grain and flour did not warrant.14 When 
the Essex Lance and its escorts neared the 
North coast of PEI on the morning of 7 May, 
local observers began an interpretive process 
that turned the real cargo of flour and grain into 
a mythical one of troops. And with that a legend 
started to take shape.
 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of 
the eyewitness accounts was that they got so 
much right. The logbooks from these American 
warships confirm a good portion of the legend. 
For instance, according to one observer the battle 
began around 0900 hours. Another, who was ten 
years old at the time, “vividly recalls that fateful 
day” when he heard explosions while playing at 
Skinner’s Pond which “rattled cupboards” and 
shocked the local populace “from their sleepy 
morning routine.” The Alacrity’s log states that 
the convoy was indeed approaching North Point 
and that this ship went to general quarters – an 
American naval term for a heightened state of 
combat readiness – for 15 minutes starting at 
0815 hours. It is also interesting that no one 
claimed to have seen the morning portion of 
the battle. Reports suggest that the sound of 
detonations were heard and felt, but that there 
was a general sense of confusion as “every time 
there was an explosion, people were running up 
to the woods and hiding. They didn’t know what 
was going on.” The reason no one knew what was 
happening was provided by an air force weather 
report from Summerside. Thick fog blanketed 
the waters off PEI at 0900  hours and visibility 
was “near zero.”15 
 By mid-morning the fog began to lift, and as 
a result the testimonials from observers include 
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7visual details such as one account that recorded 
how the convoy approached the Island from the 
East.16 At first glance this does not make sense: 
after rounding the Gaspé Peninsula ships heading 
for the Northumberland Strait came from the 
North. Another, more detailed report told a 
similar tale. Jim Morrissey had a great view of 
the developing battle from the top of the North 
Point lighthouse: “…the big ship was coming in… 
She’d have the troops on her…there were quite a 
few smaller boats…the submarine was following. 
The large ship was moving to shallower waters so 
the submarine couldn’t go underneath her.”17 The 
Essex Lance was indeed heading into shallower 
water but not for the reason Morrissey gave. 
Thanks to the poor visibility as well as flooding 
tides and heavy currents, the convoy had been 
pushed well out to sea during its transit through 
the Gulf. When the escorts’ radars finally made 
landfall it was quickly determined that the convoy 
had overshot the mouth of the Northumberland 
Strait. Correcting this error gave the appearance 
Although the United States Coast Guard identiﬁed their corvettes as patrol boats, these photographs of HMCS 
Beauharnois (top) and USS Intensity (bottom) show how shore observers could easily mistake an American for a 
Canadian ship.
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8A reconstruction of the log from 
USS Alacrity shows how the convoy 
had to round North Point because 
tidal and weather conditions 
caused it to miss the mouth of the 
Northumberland Strait. The log 
also shows that the Alacrity went to 
action stations at 1310 exactly when 
and where eyewitnesses said a 
battle took place.
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9A reconstruction of the log from 
USS Alacrity shows how the convoy 
had to round North Point because 
tidal and weather conditions 
caused it to miss the mouth of the 
Northumberland Strait. The log 
also shows that the Alacrity went to 
action stations at 1310 exactly when 
and where eyewitnesses said a 
battle took place.
May.20 Only one conclusion can be drawn from 
such overwhelming evidence – there was no 
battle.
 Rather, an eagerness to test the mettle of the 
crews and the fighting strength of their newly 
commissioned ships led the commanding officers 
of the Haste, Intensity and Alacrity to conduct a 
series of weapons’ drills and live firing exercises 
during the passage to Halifax. What the islanders 
had likely first heard, and then later saw, was 
a series of three exercises conducted at 0815 
hours and 1130 hours followed by the one that 
was interpreted as the battle’s climax at 1310 
hours. While it appears that it was the Intensity 
and Haste that were actually doing the shooting, 
their logs offer only sketchy details. Fortunately 
the Alacrity’s log was extremely well maintained, 
and thanks to their efforts it is possible to get a 
sense of what the eyewitness probably saw.21 
 Although it occurred two days earlier, the 
details of the Alacrity’s weapons’ test provide 
a good sense of what Haste and Intensity did 
off the coast of PEI: “Stopped. Lying to making 
preparations to hold test firing of 4” gun, 4 
rounds expended. No casualties. Held test firing 
of hedgehog [an ahead-firing anti-submarine 
This photograph, which captured two corvettes involved in anti-submarine warfare exercises off Halifax in December 
1941, shows how easy it would be to mistake surface forces involved in a practice attack with the real thing.
of an eastern approach. Rather than being a 
source of protection, the shoals represented a 
grounding hazard that had to be avoided through 
further course alterations.18 The comparison 
between what actually happened on the ships 
and the perceptions of those ashore makes an 
important point: the facts as reported by the 
eyewitnesses were often correct even if their 
interpretation was not. 
 The same was true for the so-called battle. 
Hours had passed since the first explosion had 
been heard and further detonations – along 
with the arrival of an RCAF aircraft – helped to 
build a growing sense of excitement among the 
spectators on shore. The climax soon followed 
with an “unsuccessful attempt by [the] U-boat to 
sink [the] cargo ship at about 1:00 pm.”19 But 
while the Alacrity did go to general quarters at 
1310 hours for a short three-minute period in 
the exact spot where the witnesses said the battle 
took place, none of the American logbooks even 
hint at the presence of a U-boat. Signals from the 
corvettes to Halifax were equally devoid of any 
reference to sighting the enemy, explaining why an 
action report – a mandatory procedure anytime 
American warships were involved in combat 
– was not filed by these ships for the month of 
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projectile]. 26 charges expended, No casualities. 
Held test firing of depth charges 2 charges 
expended. No casualties. Test completed.”22 
The depth charges and hedgehog would have 
been particularly impressive. The shallow water 
around North Point ensured that the contact-
fused hedgehogs exploded while the depth 
charges would have produced towering water 
geysers filled with dark silt. Those on shore 
would have had no idea that it was just a drill, 
and as a result the combination of gunfire and 
underwater pyrotechnics produced a spectacular 
show that was easily confused for a battle. 
 The aircraft that at least one witness claimed 
dealt the final deathblow to the U-boat can also 
be explained. Despite the poor visibility that 
day, a 119 Squadron Lockheed Hudson from 
Chatham, New Brunswick, managed to take off 
at 1230 hours. Half an hour later it was circling 
over North Point – just as the witnesses reported. 
Its mission was to carry out routine “creeping 
line” searches ahead of the convoy, which it did 
without incident.23 Dipping in and out of a thick 
ceiling of cloud cover, this aircraft did not even 
spot the convoy let alone a U-boat. 
 The documentary evidence strongly 
suggests that the myth was based on a series 
of misinterpretations and coincidences, but the 
question surrounding the modern day discovery 
of the wreck off PEI remains. Upon closer 
scrutiny the spark that triggered so much interest 
in the legend loses much of its luster. During an 
interview with a journalist, the diver who located 
the wreck started to express doubts about his 
find, observing that he “cannot say for certain that 
what he saw was a German U-boat.” The object 
he saw was covered in sand, and attempts to take 
photographs during two subsequent dives did not 
succeed because of poor lighting and turbulent 
waters.24 An attempt by the Canadian navy to 
find the wreck in the mid-1990s further casts 
doubts on the original claim. Using its side scan 
Shallow depth charge attacks like 
those produced in the 100 feet of 
water around North Point, PEI would 
have resulted in large and silt-ﬁlled 
explosions.  This dramatic effect 
would only add to the confusion of 
observers on shore.
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sonar, the minesweeper HMCS Morseby searched 
the area without result, while on the same day 
another diver found “two large boulders the size 
of a severed submarine.”25 This suggests that the 
original sighting was the product of local stories 
having so influenced a professional diver that 
he interpreted menacing boulders in the murky 
waters around PEI as a U-boat. 
 There is also the question of what became 
of the U-376. Although improbable, there is 
circumstantial evidence that this U-boat continued 
on with its mission, and was operating in the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence in May. Having spotted what they 
believed was a slowly submerging U-boat some 
55 miles east of PEI on 16 May, the crew of an 
Avro Anson aircraft from Charlottetown dropped 
two depth charges and claimed that they had 
narrowly missed the periscope. Thirty minutes 
later an oil slick developed in the spot where the 
attack took place, a fact that was confirmed by 
another aircraft. This was not enough to convince 
the U-boat assessment committee – the Allied 
authority responsible for awarding such victories 
– which concluded that there was “insufficient 
evidence of the presence of a U-boat.”26 A 
second attack, reported five days later, was 
also inconclusive. Located some 65 miles to the 
north of the first, this encounter began when 
a Consolidated Catalina from 117 Squadron 
dropped a cluster of depth charges on what the 
crew felt was a periscope trailing convoy SQ 48. 
However, the captain of the corvette, HMCS Ville 
de Quebec, had his doubts, telling his superiors 
that the “contact could have been anything.” The 
assessment committee agreed, observing that 
there was “insufficient evidence of damage.”27 
As a result, the likelihood of finding the U-376 
in these particular locations is remote, but they 
do represent a more realistic option than North 
Point. 
 Skeptics have consistently argued that the 
North Point legend was the result of an innocent 
event being contorted beyond recognition. In 
the end they were right. But it would appear 
that the eyewitnesses had not twisted reality 
as badly as suspected, and that is perhaps the 
most fascinating aspect of the North Point legend. 
Most of what they saw actually happened. It 
was only their interpretation of those events 
that was misleading. Individuals have a natural 
tendency to fill gaps in their understanding of 
dramatic events with conjecture. And it was this 
type of speculative guesswork that allowed the 
myth to grow to the point where it developed a 
life of its own. The legend becomes part of the 
community’s common history and nothing short 
of dragging the waters around PEI will discourage 
true believers. So while the American logbooks 
leave no doubt that the shots off North Point 
were not fired in anger, the power of the legend 
nevertheless forces the overly cautious scholar to 
leave wiggle room for the remote possibility that 
According to eyewitnesses, the “death blow” struck to the North Point U-boat was delivered by an aircraft.  Air force 
records show that the only aircraft in the area was a 119 Squadron Lockheed Hudson (like the one pictured here) which 
did carry out a “creeping line” search in the area but without incident.
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a German submarine rests somewhere off the 
coast of North Point, PEI. The American records 
nevertheless make one thing clear: if there is 
a U-boat wreck there it was the product of the 
most improbable fluke shot of the Second World 
War. 
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